



---



# Formalising the institutional interpretation of actions in an extended BDI logic



**Carole Adam**  
**Robert Demolombe**  
**Vincent Louis**



# Introduction


- Existing logical frameworks for social or institutional concepts:
  - Independent from mental attitudes
  - Dedicated to the semantics of communicative acts
- Aim: combine the intentional and institutional dimensions of both communicative and material actions
- Institution = set of rules and facts accepted by a group of agents (members of the institution)
  - Either formal or informal
  - Ex: law of a country, rules of a game, business contract, social structure...



---

# Outline

- State of the art
- Logical BDI framework
- Logical model of institutional dimension of actions
- Illustration: formalisation of example actions



# 1. State of the art

## Existing formalisations of artificial institutions



# Fornara and Colombetti

## Social commitments


- Castelfranchi's notion of commitment = what an agent is publicly committed to
- $C_{id}(state, debtor, creditor, content|condition[, timeout])$
- Life cycle described by a finite state machine
- Social semantics of ACL
  
- Limitations:
  - No explicit context of validity of commitments
  - No formalisation of mental attitudes



# Lorini *et al.*

## Group acceptance

- Hakli's notion (2006) = "decision to treat  $p$  as true in one's utterances and actions"
- Informal institutions = rules accepted by a group
- $[C:x] \varphi$  : agents in  $C$  accept  $\varphi$  while functioning as group members in institutional context  $x$
- Used to define some institutional concepts (institutional truth and contextual conditionals)
- Limitations:
  - Limited to informal institutions (institutional truth = facts accepted by members)
  - No dynamic operators thus no institutional dimension of actions



## 2. Logical framework

**An extended BDI logic**



# Standard logical modalities

- Epistemic modalities
  - $B_i \varphi$  :  $i$  believes that  $\varphi$
  - $I_i \varphi$  :  $i$  intends that  $\varphi$
- Dynamic modalities
  - $\text{done}(i, \alpha, \varphi)$  :  $i$  has just performed  $\alpha$  before what  $\varphi$  was true
  - $\text{happens}(i, \alpha, \varphi)$  :  $i$  is about to perform  $\alpha$  and  $\varphi$  will be true just after
- Deontic modalities
  - $O \varphi$  : it is obligatory that  $\varphi$
  - $P \varphi = \neg O \neg \varphi$  : it is permitted that  $\varphi$





# Institutional modalities

## 1. Institutional fact

- $D_s \varphi$  : in institution  $s$ , it is official that  $\varphi$
- Fact true in the context of an institution  $s$
- Not physically observable, stored in the registry of  $s$
- Examples:
  - $D_{\text{FrenchRepublic}} \text{married}(\text{jean}, \text{marie})$
  - $D_{\text{FrenchRepublic}} \text{licensed}(\text{pierre})$



# Institutional modalities

## 2. Normative consequence

- Count as (Sergot & Jones, 1996)
- $\varphi \Rightarrow_s \psi$  : according to norms holding in  $s$ ,  
 $\varphi$  entails  $\psi$
- Deduction of institutional facts from  
observable facts
  - Property :  $(\varphi \Rightarrow_s \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow D_s \psi)$
- Examples:
  - $\forall i \text{ hasBadge}(i) \Rightarrow_{\text{OrangeLab}} P \text{ happens}(i, \text{enter}, T)$



# Institutional modalities


## 3. Institutional power

- $\text{power}(i, s, \text{cond}, \text{proc}, n) = (\text{cond} \wedge \text{done}(i, \text{proc}, T)) \Rightarrow_s n$
- $i$  has the power, by performing  $\text{proc}$  in a context where  $\text{cond}$  holds, to make  $n$  officially true in  $s$
- Example:
  - $\forall i, j \text{ power}(\text{mayor}, \text{FrenchRepublic}, \text{agree}(i, j), \text{declareMarried}(\text{mayor}, i, j), \text{married}(i, j))$



# Comparison with existing work

- Ratified mental attitude = MA acknowledged by (and recorded in) the institution
  - Similar to Gaudou *et al.*'s grounding, or to Lorini *et al.*'s acceptance
- Ratified belief :  $D_s B_i \varphi$ 
  - It is official in  $s$  that  $i$  believes  $\varphi$
  - Similar to Colombetti *et al.* propositional commitments
- Ratified intention :  $D_s I_i \varphi$ 
  - It is official in  $s$  that  $i$  intends to see to it that  $\varphi$
  - Similar to or to Colombetti *et al.* commitments in action



---

# Logical model of the institutional interpretation of actions

**Features of action  $\alpha$  in institution  $s$**




# Permission precondition $\varphi$

- Necessary and sufficient condition to have the permission in  $s$  to perform  $\alpha$
- *Ex: to pay an object in a shop gives the permission to take it*
- Permission precondition axiom:  
$$\varphi \leftrightarrow D_s P \text{ happens}(i, \alpha, T)$$
- Implicit effect of  $\alpha$ :  
$$\text{done}(i, \alpha, T) \Rightarrow_s B_i \varphi$$



# Associated sanction $\chi$

- Associated with the forbidden performance of the action
- *Ex: stealing an object in a shop exposes to fines or prison*
- Unauthorised execution axiom:  
$$\text{done}(i, \alpha, \neg\varphi) \Rightarrow_s \chi$$



# Power precondition $\psi_i$ and institutional effect $\omega_i$


## □ Institutional effect $\omega_i$ :

- New institutional facts created in  $s$  by the performance of  $\alpha$
- *Ex: a mayor declaring a wedding makes the two people married*

## □ Power precondition $\psi_i$ :


- Additional condition necessary to deduce  $\omega_i$
- *Ex: the mayor must ensure that these two people agree to get married*





# Power precondition $\psi_i$ and institutional effect $\omega_i$

- Explicit institutional effect axiom:  
 $\forall a, \text{power}(a, s, \psi_i, \alpha, \omega_i)$
- Several pairs  $\langle \psi_i, \omega_i \rangle$  for each action
- In particular  $\langle \neg\phi, \chi \rangle$
  
- Theorem:  $\text{after}(a, \alpha, \psi_i \rightarrow D_s \omega_i)$   
(i.e.  $\neg \text{done}(a, \alpha, \psi_i \wedge \neg D_s \omega_i)$ )



# Illustration

**Formalisation of a material and a  
communicative action**



# Material action: send an order

## 1. *Features*

- $s$  = B2B contract between two businesses: client  $c$  and provider  $p$
- $\alpha$  =  $\text{sendOrder}(c,p,id)$  : client  $c$  sends purchase order  $id$  to provider  $p$
- $\varphi$  =  $\text{haveCatalogue}(c,p)$  :  $c$  has  $p$ 's catalogue
- $\chi$  =  $O \text{ done}(c,\text{pay}(c,p,100),T)$  : obligation to pay damages
- $\psi$  =  $\text{isCorrect}(id)$
- $\omega$  =  $O \text{ done}(p,\text{processOrder}(p,c,id),T)$



# Material action: send an order


## 2. *Institutional rules*

- Permission precondition axiom:  
$$\text{haveCatalogue}(c,p) \leftrightarrow D_{\text{B2B}} P \text{ done}(c,\text{sendOrder}(c,p,\text{id}),T)$$
- Implicit effect:  
$$\text{done}(c,\text{sendOrder}(c,p,\text{id}),T) \Rightarrow_{\text{B2B}} B_c \text{ haveCatalogue}(c,p)$$
- Sanction for unauthorised performance:  
$$\text{done}(c,\text{sendOrder}(c,p,\text{id}), \neg \text{haveCatalogue}(c,p)) \Rightarrow_{\text{B2B}} \\ O \text{ done}(c,\text{pay}(c,p,100),T)$$
- Explicit institutional effect:  
$$\text{power}(c,\text{B2B},\text{isCorrect}(\text{id}),\text{sendOrder}(c,p,\text{id}), \\ O \text{ done}(p,\text{processOrder}(p,c,\text{id}),T))$$



# Communicative action: declare

- $\text{Declare}(i,j,s,\text{cond},n)$  :  $i$  declares to  $j$  in the setting of institution  $s$  that given condition  $\text{cond}$ , the fact  $n$  is now established
- Intentional dimension (FIPA like)
  - $\text{FP} = \neg B_i D_s n$
  - $\text{RE} = B_j D_s n$
- Institutional dimension
  - $\text{PP} = \text{power}(i,s,\text{cond},\text{Declare}(i,j,s,\text{cond},n),n)$
  - Sanction depends on institution, content, role of  $i$ ...
  - $\text{IE} = \{ \langle \text{cond} , n \wedge B_j D_s n \rangle \}$



# Conclusion


**Formalising the institutional interpretation of actions in an extended BDI logic**




# Conclusion

- Unified formalisation:
  - Intentional and institutional dimensions
  - Material and communicative actions
- Future work:
  - Institutional semantics for FIPA speech acts
- Implemented in a multi-agent application:
  - Using JSA (JADE Semantics Add-on)
  - Mediation platform for automatic B2B exchanges

# Demonstration this afternoon







Thank you for  
listening

Questions ?



# Commitments vs obligations

- Obligations:
  - Imposed by the institution
  - Independant of the agent's will
  - Violation exposes to specified sanctions
- Commitments:
  - Voluntary, intentional (result of a promise)
  - No sanction specified *a priori* for violation
- Possible links in specific cases
  - Obligation to respect commitments (B2B contract)
  - Commitment to respect obligations (obeying agent)